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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The policy of the drafters of the CPLR was to broaden disclosure
against the state and against litigants in general.8 6 The Court of Ap-
peals' sound construction in Kaplan reinforces the liberalization in-
tended by the present disclosure article.
CPLR 3124: Statute does not mandate immediate ruling on dispute
at examination before trial.
When a deponent declines to answer a question in a disclosure
proceeding, the party taking the deposition may (1) file a formal mo-
tion on notice to compel disclosure after completing the remainder
of the deposition, 7 or in certain courts, (2) seek an immediate in-
formal ruling from the presiding judge of the ex parte motion part.88
In Cohen v. Heine & Co., 9 the defendants, who had not sought
an immediate ruling on disputed questions by the presiding judge,
who was available, moved to strike the case from the calendar. The
Supreme Court, Nassau County, denied the motion and held that
the defendants had waived their right to seek disclosure of the con-
troverted questions. The Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed without prejudice to the defendants' right to move at special
term for further disclosure.9 0 Deeming it error to interpret CPLR
3124 as mandating that "in chambers" rulings be sought, the court
indicated that the CPLR contemplates a single post-disclosure mo-
tion.91
This decision correctly construes CPLR 3124. A party is entitled
to make an omnibus motion for formal rulings as to all disputed
questions. The informal procedure offers speed and convenience, but
a formal motion better assures the formulation of a record for pos-
(1953). In construing the words "any... person," other than a party, subject to disclosure
under CPA 288, the Court therein stated:
Courts should not strain to limit the availability of such an important remedy,
by narrowly circumscribing the reach of words so inclusive as "any . . . person,"
whose very generality bespeaks a legislative design that the provision be
accorded a very broad content. Of exceeding significance is the consideration
that the "testimonial duty to disclose knowledge needed in judicial investiga-
tion" is essentially one that rests upon all persons alike, upon public officers
and agents, as well as upon private individuals.
305 N.Y. at 377, 113 N.E.2d at 524.
86See Tely v. State, 49 Misc. 2d 418, 267 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Chester v.
Zima, 41 Misc. 2d 676, 246 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1964); Roma v. Newspaper
Consol. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 1085, 244 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963).
87 This procedure is authorized by CPLR 3124.
88 CPLR 3124 does not expressly provide for this procedure although it is commonly
practiced in certain areas. See 7B McK1NNEY'S CPLR 8124, commentary at 629 (1970).
89 89 App. Div. 2d 563, 331 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
90 Id., 331 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
91 Id., citing 7B McI~NNEY'S CPLR 3124, commentary at 628-31 (1970).
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sible appeal.92 Failure to utilize the informal procedure is not a waiver
of the right to a formal ruling.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: Court of Appeals affirms that prior judgment
establishing freedom from negligence does not establish freedom from
contributory negligence.
In Nesbitt v. Nimmich,93 the Court of Appeals recently affirmed
without opinion an Appellate Division, Second Department, decision
which held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not operate
to establish the plaintiffs freedom from contributory negligence where
his freedom from negligence as a defendant was determined in a
prior action. The case involved a personal injury action between
parties who were co-defendants in the prior suit. The Second Depart-
ment's refusal to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
was based on the difference in the burden of proof accompanying
the movant's change in status from defendant to plaintiff. The plain-
tiff's inability to establish the defendant's negligence in the prior
action should not permit the inference that the defendant can over-
come his burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence in
a subsequent action in which he is the plaintiff.
ARTicLE 71- REcoVERY OF CHAT L
CPLR 7102: Due process protects all types of property.
Since the 1969 Supreme Court decision in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,94 there have been important developments in replevin
law. In Sniadach, the Court set the direction by declaring that a hear-
ing or an opportunity to defend a replevin action before the garnish-
ment of one's salary was necessary to satisfy the requirements of due
process. While Sniadach was concerned with wages, a "specialized type
of property"9 5 the deprivation of which may cause great personal
92 7B McKINNEYS CPLR 3124, commentary at 630 (1970), citing Tri-State Pipe Lines
Corp. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 285, 273 N.Y.S.2d 976 (lst Dep't 1966), discussed
in The Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 128, 142 (1967).
93 80 N.Y.2d 622, 282 N.E.2d 328, 331 N.YS.2d 438 (1972), aff'g mem. 34 App. Div. "2d
958, 812 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JoIN's L. REv. 500, 521 (1971).
94895 U.S. 387 (1969). For extended discussion of Sniadach, see Note, Provisional
Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Con-
stitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBnAN~Y L. Rv. 426, 438 (1970); Note,
Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 CoLUas. L. Rxv. 942 (1970); The Quarterly Survey, 46
ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 355, 879 (1971).
95 895 U.S. at 340.
